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The Coming of Age of Strict
Products Liability in Ohio
In Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,' the Ohio Supreme Court took the
final step in its march toward the adoption of a strict products liability
cause of action in Ohio. Specifically, the court approved Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A 2 as the standard for imposing strict liability
upon a manufacturer for injuries suffered by users or consumers of
products. It abolished the prior practice of recovery on the basis of
"implied warranty in tort," although the elements of that theory appear to
persist in the new strict products liability cause of action.
Notwithstanding this important step, Ohio law has not unreservedly
embraced strict products liability doctrine. The Temple opinion leans
toward the imposition of a "less than strict" standard, reminiscent of
negligence law duties to exercise reasonable care, for the liability of a
manufacturer for defects in the intended design of the product, but
imposes true section 402A strict products liability standards upon defects
arising in the manufacturing process. The purpose of this Note is to
examine the evolution of a tort-based strict products liability cause of
action for the injured product user in Ohio, with special attention to some
of the strict products liability questions that will undoubtedly confront the
Ohio courts in the future.
I. THE BASES OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY
The emergence of the strict tort cause of action as a major nationwide
products liability theory of recovery has, in a legal sense, been accom-
plished with an astounding degree of celerity, and makes for a rather
interesting legal tale.' More importantly, however, an understanding of
the forces that hastened and shaped that evolution is essential to an
evaluation of the importance of strict tort liability a; a component of the
body of products liability law. In large part, the development of strict
products liability theory was a gradual judicial response to a combination
of influences that have pressed the American courts since the Industrial
Revolution. One major pressure was a heightened social concern over the
explosive growth in numbers of manufactured goods and an accompany-
ing increase in their capacity to injure purchasers of those goods, subpur-
chasers, incidental users, and bystanders. The interaction of this circum-
1. 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), quoted at note 76 infra.
3. This story has perhaps been most aptly told by Dean Prosser. See Prosser, 77Tw Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
The Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consuner), 50 MINN. L. Ruv, 791
(1966) (hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Falin. See also Keeton, Manufacturer's LIabiliti: The
Meaning of'Defect' in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYJIACtiSE L. RLV. 559. 559-60
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability].
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stance with a growing judicial awareness of the shortcomings of existing
modes of recovery for such product-caused injury in the modern commer-
cial world has spawned contemporary "strict products liability" doctrine.
Discussion of the evolution of strict products liability law should begin
with an examination of the social and legal forces that coalesced to provide
the favorable judicial atmosphere in which strict products liability theory
could germinate and flourish.
A. Policy Justifications for Greater Consumer4 Protection
in Twentieth Century Mass Markets
The social anxieties that prodded courts in Ohio and elsewhere to
embrace consumer-favored modifications in traditional modes of products
liability recovery and to eventually adopt strict products liability can
ultimately be traced back to the Industrial Revolution.5 At the outset of
that revolution, public sentiment favored the protection of growing
industries, because of the prosperity those industries could generate. But
explosive and sometimes troublesome strides in the commercial world
gradually provoked a societal and judicial solicitude toward affording
maximum protection to human life and health. Twentieth century
marketing techniques that sought to create widespread consumer depend-
ence upon a variety of mass-marketed products were paralleled by
unprecedented strides in industrial technology that produced greater
numbers and types of goods to satisfy that accelerating consumer demand.
Increased numbers of products led to increases in the number of unrea-
sonably dangerous products, and greater complexity and power in the
goods distributed was often accompanied by a greater capacity to injure.
As the deleterious side effects of commercial development in the twentieth
century became increasingly more apparent to the courts, the industrial
system achieved an economic stability that obviated any further need for
judicial paternalism. For the most part, it was this societal awareness that
4. The term "consumer" is used in this paper to mean a purchaser of goods at retail for use (as
opposed to resale), a subsequent subpurchaser of the goods, an incidental user of the goods, or a
bystander affected in some way by the goods.
5. Of the many extended treatments of the policy underpinnings of strict products liability law,
this sampling is representative: Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STMN. L REV.
1077 (1965); Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 17 Bus. Lw. 157(1961); Holford, The
imnits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEXS L. RE". 81 824 (1973);
James. General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Neghkgence?. 24 TENN. L. REV.
923 (1957); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's LJ. 30,34-35 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Keeton, Product Liability]; Keeton, Manufacturer's Liabilitvy supra note3,at 561;
Keeton. Products Liability-Sone Observations About Allocation of Risks. 64 Mii. L. REV. 1329.
1331-34 (1966): Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and Past
Vandermark. 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 30 (1965); Noel, Manufacturers of Products-Thre Drift Tolvard
Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963 (1957); Prosser. The Fall. supra note 3, at 799-801: Prosser. Thre
Assault, supra note 3; Traynor. The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products attd Strict Liability. 32
TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L. 825
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers. 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wade. Strict Tort Liabilitrl .
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induced the courts to assure consumers a more certain mode of protection
against unreasonably dangerous products, one that would conform to
modern commercial realities free from unnecessary legal impediments.
Although this emphasis upon the protection of physical welfare was
the primary factor in hastening the emergence of strict tort liability,
economic realities of the modern industrial world urged that the burden
imposed upon injured consumers in redressing product-related injuries be
lightened. The courts came to recognize that the supplier of goods was in
the best economic position to bear the cost of redressing injuries caused by
its products in the course of reasonable and ordinary use. In an equitable
sense, the supplier of goods was the one to profit from their sale, and so
should be the one to assume the cost of insuring against the possibility of
injury from the use of defective goods. Of course, this cost was passed on
to the consumer in the form of higher prices. Thus, the result of imposing
strict products liability upon the supplier was to distribute the risks that
accompany the increasing use of products throughout a product-
dependent society by means of higher prices for those products, rather
than visiting that cost upon the occasional unfortunate consumer who is
injured.
As another policy justification, the decisions pointed out that impos-
ing strict products liability upon the supplier might well produce a
deterrent effect. The seller, who was best able to improve product safety,
might find economic value in developing safer products. Once again, a
portion of the cost of these safety developments could be passed on to the
buyers. If safer products were developed, buyer and seller alike might
benefit through less costly goods and a larger profit margin, as well as the
attendant mitigation of human suffering.
Finally, the courts relied upon warranty theory in promoting strict
products liability. By putting goods upon the market and by promoting
them with twentieth-century mass-marketing techniques, the suppliers of
the goods had induced consumer sales, at least in part, by representing
those goods as wholesome and noninjurious. Consumers bought the
goods with expectations that they would be safe, and the supplier would
be held to a strict accounting when those expectations were frus-
trated by harmful products.
B. Difficulties Associated With Traditional Theories
of Products Liability Recovery
1. Negligence
Coupled with the social policy factors that contributed to the adop-
tion of more prophylactic consumer protection measures was a sharpened
judicial sensitivity to the imperfections of traditional theories of products
liability recovery, such as negligence theory. There is considerable truth
in the observation that "[i]t is often difficult, or even impossible, to prove
[Vol. 39.586
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negligence on the part of a manufacturer or supplier."6 The plaintiff in a
negligence suit must show not only a shortcoming in the product that made
it unreasonably dangerous, but also that such a product became defective
or was allowed to be sold in its defective condition because of the
manufacturer's or seller's failure to exercise the care of a reasonable man of
ordinary prudence. The plaintiff faces a sizable task in establishing a lack
of due care on the part of the manufacturer of a product. As a first hurdle,
the increasing specialization of industry might mean that a single product
could be made up of several components produced by different manufac-
turers; the duty of the manufacturer of the final product is often limited
only to testing and inspecting that final product.8 Thus, the plaintiff
would have difficulty in establishing that a particular defendant was
responsible for the injury. Even if the product were completely manufac-
tured by one defendant, considerable time and expense would be required
to show, as the plaintiff must,9 that the manufacturer failed to exercise
reasonable care in choosing materials for the product, and in designing,
constructing, and inspecting the product.10 The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may relieve the plaintiff of the burden of establishing specific
evidence of negligent acts by raising an inference of negligence," if the
accident is such that it would not have occurred if ordinary reasonable care
had been exercised; but the res ipsa loquitur doctrine has been subject to
special disabilities in the products liability area.12 Even if res ipsa loquitur
6. Wade, supra note 5, at 826.
7. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 150 (4th ed. 1971).
8. See 2 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §7:8.at 124-26(2ded.
1974).
9. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN. PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 6-8 (1978).
10. See Keeton, Products Liability-Problenms Pertaining to Proofof.Veglience. 19 SW. U. 26
(1965); Comment, Products Liability- The E-pansion of Fraud., Negligence. attd Strict Tort Liabilitu.
64 MicH. L. REV. 1350, 1362 (1966).
1I. To invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, three conditions must be met:
1. The event [the injury resulting from the use of a product] must be of a kind '.hich
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence;
2. It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control ofthe
defendant;
3. It must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff.
W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 39, at 214. In most jurisdictions, satisfaction of the conditions precedent
to invocation of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will allow, but not compel, the jury to infer that the
defendant was negligent. The doctrine in those jurisdictions allows the plaintiff to avoid having a
verdict directed against him after he has introduced evidence of the necessary conditions, and no
burden of persuasion is shifted to the defendant. The procedural effect of a res ipsa loquitur
instruction is not uniform, however, and some jurisdictions give the invocation oftheresipsaloquitur
doctrine greater weight, e.g., by holding that it creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence, shifting
to the defendant the burden of persuasion to meet or overcome the presumption. Ud § 40.
12. One requirement for invocation of res ipsa is that the injury resulting from the use of a
product must be caused by an instrumentality "within the exclusive control of the defendant." See
note I 1supra. The observation has been made that -[t]o the extent that a court takes astringent'. iem
and refuses to apply res ipsa loquitur unless the product is in the physical possession ofthe defendant, it
will be relatively more difficult for a plaintiff to utilize res ipsa loquitur to show the negligence of the
defendant.- Note, Products Liability':A Synopsis, 30 Omo ST. L.J. 551,561(1969). The reluctance
of the courts to apply res ipsa loquitur liberally has been explained in these terms:.
1978]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL [
were to raise an inference of negligence, that inference could be rebutted by
a showing of proper care on the part of the defendant.' 3  Furthermore,
when res ipsa loquitur is not applicable, the plaintiff encounters substantial
evidentiary problems in establishing a standard of care in a particular
product area and its breach by the defendant.'
4
Beyond these problems that burden a negligence suit against any, seller
of a product, such a suit is almost futile in asserting liability against a
middleman, that is, the distributor, wholesaler, or retailer, as opposed to
the manufacturer. If the middleman knows of a defect of which the
consumer will not be aware, he must warn the consumer. As a rule,
however, the middleman has no duty to inspect or test goods he sells,'15
even if with proper testing he might have discovered such a defect. 16 This
is especially true when the product is sold in its original package or
container, for the seller in that case is a mere conduit between the
manufacturer and buyer.'7 Even in regard to a seller of a product not sold
in its original package, there is usually no duty to discover latent defects
The fact that plaintiff's injury was received at a time when the product was out of the
manufacturer's control is extremely important as regards an inference of negligence against
the manufacturer. The nature of the accident in itself will not normally justify a finding that
the accident was the kind that would not ordinarily occur without negligence on the part of
the manufacturer. For example, evidence that a mechanic and body finisher was injurcd
when an abrasive disc grinder manufactured by the defendant broke and struck the plaintiff
was regarded as insufficient as a matter of law. So also, proof by the plaintiff that he was
injured by the escape of boiling water from a vaporizer manufactured by defendant was not,
without evidence as to why the water escaped, a sufficient foundation for a finding of
negligence.
Keeton, supra note 10, at 35-36 (footnotes omitted). For further discussion of the problems of
utilizing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in establishing negligence in products liability cases. see Carr.
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Ohio: Does Any "'Thing" or "Control" Speak For ltself, 29 Onto ST. L.J. 399
(1968); Comment, supra note 10.
13. See discussion in Ryan v. Zweck-Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 64 N.W.2d 226 (1954). Seealso
discussion at I L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, § 12.03[7]. at 336.
14. See authorities cited at note 10 supra. Prosser suggests this practical reason for the
eagerness with which plaintiffs' attorneys urge the courts to embrace the theory of strict liability:
No writer seems to have suggested that the answer lies in the preparation for trial, the
negotiations for settlement, and the amount of the verdict. So long as the negligence issue
remains in the case, it must be litigated, and plaintiff's counsel must be prepared to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, including even experts. He may even be forced to look up a
little law, which is a thing from which some personal injury lawyers notoriously shrink. So
long as there is the possibility that negligence may not be found, the defendant is encouraged
by vain hopes, and the plaintiffgnawed by lingering doubts; and a case which can be decided
for the defendant is worth less, in terms of settlement, than one which can not. And so long
as the defendant can introduce evidence of his own due care, the possibility remains that it
may influence the size of the verdict, as jurymen impressed with it stubbornly hold out for no
liability, or a smaller sum.
Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1116.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965). See also cises cited at I R. Htiqt& H.
BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2:37, at 238 n.35; Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1 (1966).
16. Continental Cas. Co. v. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 281 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1955); Zesch v,
Abrasive Co., 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944) (dictum).
17. Linker v. Quaker Oats Co., II F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Okla. 1935): Guglielmo v, K:isner
Supply Co., 158 Conn. 308, 259 A.2d 608 (1969); Alfieri v. Cabot Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 455. 235
N.Y.S.2d 753 (1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1027, 245 N.Y.S. 2d 600 (1963). See also I R. HtRSItI & H.
BAILEY, supra note 8, § 2:39, at 244-45.
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through proper testing, and the middleman will not be held liable for
injuries arising from those defects.' 8
As a practical matter, the greatest obstacle to recovery for a plaintiff
founding his claim upon a manufacturer's negligence is his own failure to
observe a reasonable standard of care with respect to his own safety, which
failure contributes to his own injuries. Such contributory negligence on the
part of a plaintiff disentitles him to pursue a negligence suit against the
maker of the product.19
2. Warranty
Recovery under the other traditional products liability cause of
action, breach of warranty, was also complicated by rules that made
recovery for the injured product user problematic. During the evolution-
ary stages of strict products liability doctrine, redress predicated upon an
express or implied warranty was subject in most states, including Ohio,20
to the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.2' Decisions under the Act
followed traditional notions that, in order to recover upon a warranty,
the plaintiff must show reliance in fact upon the seller's express or implied
warranty. 2 Thus, for example, the buyer of a bottle of liniment was
denied recovery against the manufacturer upon an express warranty on the
label, because the buyer had not actually relied upon the warranty at the
time of purchase.23  This obstacle to recovery has largely disappeared as
the states, including Ohio, have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under the Code, the implied warranty of merchantability attaches as a
matter of law; its existence is not conditioned upon a showing of reliance
24by the injured user of a product.
18. Burgess v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 264 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1959) (applying Kansas law);
McMeekin v. Gimbel Bros., 223 F. Supp. 896 (W.D. Penn. 1963) (applying Pennsylvania law); Odum
v. Gulf Tire & Supply Co., 196 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Fla. 1961) (applying Florida law); Lowev. American
Mach. & Foundry Co., 132 Ga. App. 572,208 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Peltierv. Seabird Indus., Inc..304 So.
2d 695 (La. App. 1974), cert. denied, 309 So. 2d 343 (La. 1975); Levis v. Zapolitz, 72 NJ. Super. 168,
178 A.2d 44 (1962); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weeks-Allen Motor Co.. 18 N.C. App. 689. 198
S.E.2d 88 (1973); Martin v. Schoonover, 13 Wash. App. 48,533 P.2d 438 (1975).
19. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 65, at 416-27. It should be observed, however, that in the
jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence principles, the plaintiff's own negligence will
not bar his negligence suit, but rather will only reduce the recoverable damages. See id. § 67.
20. 99 Ohio Laws 413 (1908), (repealed and superseded by the adoption of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in Ohio on July 1. 1962, codified at Oio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1302.01-.98
(Page 1962)).
21. 1 UIFORM LAWS ANN. §§ 12-16(1950).
22. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Independent Metal Prod. Co.. 203 F.2d 838(8th Cir. 1953)
(applying Nebraska law); Pedroli v. Russell, 157 Cal. App. 2d 281, 320 P.2d 873 (1958); Bleacher v.
Bristol-Myers Co., 163 A.2d 526 (Del. 1960); Continental Cas. Co. v. Belknap Hardware & Mfg. Co..
281 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1955); Oppenheimer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 7 Ohio App. 2d 103.219 N.E.2d 54
(1964); Kennedy-Ingalls Corp. v. Meissner, II Wis. 2d 371. 105 N.W.2d 748 (1960).
23. Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 238 Minn. 10, 54 N.W.2d 769 (1952). Accord.Torpeyv.
Red Owl Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Marhenke, 121 F.2d 598
(9th Cir. 1941); Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946).
24. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.27 (Page 1962); U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972). The Uniform
Commercial Code became effective in Ohio in 1962. 129 Ohio Laws 13 (1961) (effective July 1, 1962).
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Another obstacle to recovery upon a theory of breach of warranty
under the Uniform Sales Act was that a buyer could not recover if he failed
to give notice of the breach to the seller.2 5  Uniform Commercial Code
section 2-607(3)(a) preserves this rule, barring the buyer from any remedy
unless he notifies the seller of any breach within a reasonable time after he
discovers or should have discovered it.
26
Perhaps the most imposing barrier to recovery upon a warranty
theory is the seller's right to disclaim any implied warranties, recognized
under the Uniform Sales Act27 and the Uniform Commercial Code.28
Although these disclaimers have recently been successfully attacked on
various grounds2 9 and often involve problems of unconscionability under
section 302 of the Code,30 the careful seller and his resourceful attorney
may nevertheless be able under the Code to exclude warranties in a
conscionable fashion.3
3. The PrivitY Bar
Although the foregoing aspects of negligence and warranty recovery
often contributed to the frustration of consumer remedies for injuries
sustained in the course of using unwholesome products, the most formida-
ble and consistent bar to consumer recovery was the traditional require-
ment that the injured plaintiff be in privity of contract with any potential
defendant. The absence of privity served as an absolute roadblock to the
plaintiff's suit in negligence, and the prospect that the manufacturer or
seller of a product could be liable in a negligence suit to users other than
those in privity of contract with him suggested to Lord Abinger "the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit."'' 2 The
reticence of the courts to expose manufacturers to liability beyond the
25. 1A UNIFORI LAWS ANN. § 49 (1950).
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.65 (Page 1962); U.C.C. § 2-6.07(3)(a) (1972),
27. IA UNIFORM LAWS ANN. § 71(1950).
28. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1962); U.C.C. § 2-316 (1972).
29. See, e.g.. Marion Power Shovel Co. v. Huntsman. 246 Ark. 152, 437 SW.2d 784 (1969);
Guntert & Zimmerman Sales Div., Inc. v. Thermoid Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 771.31 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1963);
Uganski v. Little Giant Crane & Shovel, Inc., 35 Mich. App. 88, 192 N.W.2d 580 (197 1); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Dobias v. W,,-stern Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash.
App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883,430 S.W.2d 778 (1968); Collins v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 401, 315 A.2d 30 (1973), aff'd, 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974); Sarfati v. M.A,
Hittner & Sons. 35 App. Div. 2d 1004,318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970), appeal dismissed, 28 N.Y.2d 808,270
N.E.2d 729. 321 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1971); Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 29 App,
Div. 2d 303. 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 25 N.Y.2d 451, 255 N.E,2d 168, 306
N.Y.S.2d 934 (1969); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241, 293 NY.S.2d 538 (1969).
31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29, Comments 2 & 3 (Page 1962); U.C.C. § 2-316, Comments 2
& 3 (1972). Professor Shanker contends that most of the suggested differences between recovery in
strict tort or upon warranty theory are illusory, yet even he concedes that the availability ofdisclaimcr
as a defense in warranty actions, but not in strict tort liability actions, represents a significant difference
between the two. Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Conmercial
Code: A Conunentarr on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and ('omnmunication1s Larrier. 17
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1965).
32. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep 402,405 (Exch, 1842).
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bounds of absolute privity clearly reflected the nineteenth century public
policy of solicitude for the growth of industrial and commercial enterprise,
even at the expense of consumer protection.33
Recovery upon an implied or express warranty was governed by the
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act.34 The definitions of "buyer" and
"seller" in the Act included only the immediate parties to the contract. 35
Hence, the causes of action accorded the buyer under the Act could be
asserted only against parties with whom he was in privity. 36 Nor did the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code extend warranty protection
much beyond the boundaries of privity. As originally promulgated,
section 2-318 of the Code37 allowed recovery upon a breach of warranty
theory from any seller of the product by the buyer, his family or household,
and the guests in his home, if it was reasonably foreseeable that any of them
might pise the goods. Beyond these parties, the Code professed to be
neutral about whether the seller's warranties given to a "buyer who resells"
extended to others in thie "distributive chain."3 It was suggested that the
Code included actual subpurchasers of the original buyer within the
protection of its warranties, but that nonpurchasers remained outside the
coverage of these warranties.39 Such incidental users of a product, other
than a guest in the buyer's home or a member of his family or household,
could not avail themselves of Code warranty protection when injured by
dangerous products. Although amendments to section 2-318 have offered
the states the alternative of extending the protection of Code warranties to
more remote parties,40 the Ohio statute4' conforms to the original version.
Judicial appreciation of both the heightened social concern for the
protection of those injured by unreasonably dangerous products,
prompted largely by developments in the Industrial Revolution, and the
problematic aspects of traditional products liability causes of action that
reduced their utility to injured consumers provided a climate favorable to
33. See, e.g., Goodlander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 F. 400(7th Cir. 1894); Daughertyv.
Herzog, 44 N.E. 457 (Ind. 1896); Curtain v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70,21 A. 244 (189 1).
34. See note 20 supra.
35. IA UNIFOR.s LAws ANN. § 76 (1950): " 'Buyer' means a person %sho buss or agrees to buy
goods or any legal successor in interest of such person . . . . 'Seller' means a person who sells or
agrees to sell goods, or any legal successor in interest of such person."
36. See cases cited in I S. WILLISTO SALES § 244, at 645-50 (rev. ed. 1948). Seealso Prosser.
The Assault, supra note 3, at I 127-28, 1129 n.174.
37. Section 2-318 originally read:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that
such person may use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1962 version).
38. U.C.C. § 2-318, Comment 3 (1962 version).
39. Withers v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 878 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel
Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 375, 205 N.E.2d 92,93(1965), af'd, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227.218 N.E.2d 185
(1966). But see Shanker, supra note 3 1. at 25-27.
40. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternatives B & C (1972).
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the gradual emergence of strict products liability doctrine in the twentieth
century. This Note will now examine the course Ohio law has taken in
response to these forces, and the extent to which the Ohio courts had
embraced the strict products liability cause of action prior to Temple.
II. THE OHIO RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS IN THE
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AREA PRIOR TO Temple
A. A Partial Breach of the Privity Bar
The most serious impediment to products liability recovery for the
injured consumer was the absolute demand of privity between the plaintiff
and any prospective defendant. The privity requirement in negligence suits
was the first to be subjected to judicial erosion, as the "absolute" rule of
privity became a "general" rule with "exceptions." The most important of
these exceptions was that a manufacturer owed a duty of reasonable care
to anyone who might be expected to use a chattel, provided the chattel was
inherently or imminently dangerous, as in the case of explosives or
poisonous drugs.42 Finally, in 1916 Judge Cardozo penned the exception
that swallowed the rule. Purporting merely to "extend" the category of
"inherently" dangerous chattels to those that became so if negligently
made, Cardozo wrote: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a
thing of danger. ' 43 A blitz of cases picked up Cardozo's theme, and a
general rule evolved that a manufacturer or seller of a product for
remuneration was always liable for his negligence in placing in the stream
of commerce a product that caused injury as a proximate result of the
supplier's negligence, irrespective of whether the injured party was a
purchaser, a member of the purchaser's family, a subsequent purchaser, a
user, or a bystander.4
Although in most jurisdictions Judge Cardozo's opinion laid waste to
the general rule that a showing of privity was necessary to maintain a
negligence suit, the Ohio courts refused to give MacPherson such an
expansive reading. In White Sewing Machine Co. v. Feisel,45 the Lucas
County Court of Appeals fashioned a limited exception to the privity
requirement in negligence actions by holding that a manufacturer could be
41. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.31 (Page 1962).
42. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Trouble with this formulation arose In
determining which articles were "inherently" dangerous. See, e.g., W. PossER,supra note 7, § 96, at
642 & nn.15-18. In Ohio, see Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887).
43. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
44. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1100-03. See also Bohlen, Liability of Manufac-
turersto Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees,45 L. Q. REV. 343 (1929): Fee,er. Tort Llalillti'
of Manufacturers, 19 M INN. L. REV. 752 (1935); Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors,
10 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1925); Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REV. 134 (1937); Russell, Manufacturer's Liability to the UItltmate
Consumer, 21 Ky. L.J. 388 (1933).
45. 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (Lucas County 1927).
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held liable for its negligence in producing injury-causing goods despite the
absence of privity, when those goods were rendered "imminently danger-
ous" by its negligence. This was as far as the Ohio courts were willing to go,
however, and subsequent decisions declined to waive the privity require-
ment, except when the manufacturer's negligence resulted in an "immi-
nently dangerous" product.46  This narrow reading of MacPherson
persisted in Ohio for some forty years, and only recently have the Ohio
courts acceded to the general rule that a manufacturer can be held liable to
parties for his negligence in producing a good, when the defect in the good
causes injury to person or property, despite the absence of privity.
4 7
The growing judicial concern for the welfare of product users that led
to the relaxation of privity requirements in defining the class of potential
defendants in negligence actions led also to a redefinition of the duties to be
imposed on those who sold food and drink. Since the thirteenth century,
the common law had recognized that the seller of victuals was vested with
special responsibilities to ensure that the goods he sold would be fit for
human consumption without injury.48 In the face of mounting controver-
sy over the lack of observable health standards in the American food
industry,4 9 several. American jurisdictions,5 including Ohio,51 developed
an exception to the privity requirement in suits against food producers,
holding that a manufacturer of food products impliedly warranted to the
general public that its foods were wholesome and safe, and that such a
manufacturer was liable for breach of this implied warranty to anyone
injured by the use of the product. The formulations employed by the
Ohio courts to sidestep the privity requirements in these cases continued,
however, to recognize the contractual nature of warranty liability.
In one instance, the purchaser of baked goods from a retailer was cast
46. Schindley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co., 157 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1946) (applying Ohio law);
Blissenbach v. Yanko, 90 Ohio App. 557, 107 N.E.2d 409 (Mahoning County 1951). Despite the
refusal of these cases to allow a negligence claim because evidence was lacking that the product was
"imminently" dangerous at the time of the sale, the Ohio courts have found products inherently
dangerous or imminently so because of the manufacturer's negligence in a wide variety ofsituations.
and, as a consequence, have allowed the negligence suit to proceed. See, e.g., Wood v. General Elec.
Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953) (electric blanket); Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13
N.E.2d 250 (1938) (hair dye); Mobberly v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 126,211 N.E.2d 839
(Stark County 1965) (portable grain elevator); White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152.
162 N.E. 633 (Lucas County 1927) (sewing machine); DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co.,46 Ohio Op. 161,
102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 195 1) (grinding wheel).
47. Domany v. Otis Elevator Co., 369 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1966) (applying Ohio law), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 942 (1967); Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
48. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1103-06.
49. See Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation. I LAw & Co%TE%1P.
PROB. 3 (1933).
50. See, e.g., Mazettiv. Armour& Co., 75 Wash. 622,135 P.633(1913). Prosserestimates that
22 of 36 states to consider the question have followed Ma:ettiand imposed some sort ofspecial liability
upon the food producers or vendor. Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1107-10.
51. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (Cuyahoga County 1928);
Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 64 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 102 N.E.2d 281 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1951); Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 231,90 N.E.2d 453 (C.P. Franklin County
1948).
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as a third-party beneficiary of the implied warranty attached to the
contract of sale between the bakery and the retailer, which enabled the
injured purchaser to sue on that implied warranty.: 2  In other cases,
the definition of a "buyer" entitled to recover under the Uniform Sales
Act was construed broadly to include the purchaser's wife" and members
of the purchaser's family and household. 4
Outside the food and drink cases, however, the privity requirement in
warranty suits stood firm. Although the courts of Cuyahoga County had
taken unprecedented steps in extending the warranty liability of manufac-
turers to nonprivy parties," the Supreme Court of Ohio in Wood 1'.
General Electric Co. 56 rejected the theory of these cases and refused to
allow the purchaser of an electric blanket from a retail store to assert an
implied warranty claim against the manufacturer of the blanket with
whom he was not in privity. The supreme court subsequently reaffirmed
the rule that a claim based upon an implied warranty could only be
brought by a party in privity with the seller to whom the implied warranty
is attributed. 7
Thus, the injured consumer in Ohio in 1957 could resort to an implied
warranty action against a manufacturer or other seller with whom he was
not in privity only under limited circumstances. A negligence suit against
a manufacturer or seller was possible in the absence of privity only if the
product involved was inherently dangerous or had become imminently so
as a result of the manufacturer's negligence, or if the product involved was
food or drink.5"
52. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App, 475, 161 N.E. 557 (Cuyahoga County 1928).
53. Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 231.90 N.E.2d 453 (C.P. Franklin County 1948).
54. Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc.. 64 Ohio L. Abs. 200. 102 N.E.2d 281 (C,.
Cuyahoga County 1951).
55. In DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 58, 102 N.E.2d 289 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1951), the court refused to strike the implied warranty claim of an employee of the purchaser
asserted against the manufacturer of a grinding wheel, which had disintegrated during use and injured
the employee. The protection of the implied warranty was deemed to extend to the purchaser's
employee.
In Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1953), the
court of appeals allowed a purchaser of a bar of soap with a wire embdded in it to proceed directly
against the manufacturer on an implied warranty claim despite the absence of privity, reasoning that
notions of privity "should not protect one who sells unmerchantable goods where inspection will not
disclose the defect." Id. at 608.
56. 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8(1953).
57. Welsh v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957).
58. See Wolfe v. Great Atli. & Pac. Tea Co., 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E.2d 230 (1944); Canton
Provision Co. v. Gauder, 130 Ohio St. 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935); Clark Restaurant Co. v. Simmons, 29
Ohio App. 220, 163 N.E. 210 (Cuyahoga County 1927). These cases have allowed recovery for
negligence by a party other than the immediate purchaser against the retailer and against the food
producer, despite the absence of privity. The rationale for this aberration is twofold, First, tile
negligence in producing and selling unwholesome food results in a product "imminently dangerous" to
the consumer, and thus the privity requirement is waived pursuant to White Sewiing Afaddnh.
Second, the Ohio courts have found it negligent per se to produce and sell detective food products ill
light of Ohio's pure food laws, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3715.01-.99 (1Page 197 1), and have extended
this protection to all food consumers injured by contaminated food, regardless of privity.
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Despite this initial reluctance to extend the implied warranty theory
of liability beyond the food cases, some courts slowly began to apply the
theory to products other than foods.59 The Ohio courts took the next
important step by imposing an implied warranty of fitness upon the
manufacturer of products intended for intimate bodily use.60 In Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., 6t the Ohio Supreme Court allowed the
purchaser of a permanent wave solution to proceed directly against the
manufacturer of the solution on a theory of express warranty although
plaintiff had purchased the solution from a local retailer and clearly
enjoyed no privity with the manufacturer. The court took this unprece-
dented step with little difficulty, deeming it "but logical" that foodstuffs
and products intended for intimate bodily use posed similar capabilities
for harm, concluding that those profiting by their sale should be subjected
to a similar form of liability, one stricter than negligence. Nor, in the
court's view, should the injured product user be confined to pressing this
"warranty" theory against only those parties with whom he was in privity
of contract.
62
This decision did not, however, complete the evolution of strict
liability law; the court stressed that the injured buyer had, to her injury,
relied upon express representations made by the defendant in the course of
an extensive national advertising campaign. The court reasoned that
when the buyer relies on such inducements, and is injured when the
59. Tentative extensions of strict liability doctrine were made by holding the seller of animal
food liable on an implied warranty without requiring privity or negligence. See McAfee v. Cargill,
Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo.
1959).
60. Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County), relud
on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954). In Kruper, the court of appeals for
Cuyahoga County ruled that the injured user of a bar of soap with an embedded piece ofwire had stated
a proper cause of action against the manufacturer based upon the breach ofan "implied warranty of
merchantability," despite the absence of privity. The court specifically held:
It should also be remembered that the implied warranty of merchantability is in a sense one
imposed by law although frequently spoken of as quasi-contractual. In the case of Ward
Baking Co. v. Trizzino . . . . the court in effect held that the implied warranty of the
manufacturer was for the benefit of the ultimate consumer. The question of privity should
not protect one who sells unmerchantable goods where inspection will not disclose the defect.
Id. at 608. Accord, Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181
(Cuyahoga County 1958) (permanent wave solution).
61. 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612(1958).
62. The court's rationale for allowing recovery upon this "warranty" theory despite the absence
of privity was concise and simple:
It must be confessed that the prevailing view is that privity of contract is essential in an
action based on a breach of an express or implied warranty, and that there is no privity
between the manufacturer of an article and the ultimate purchaser thereof from a retailer.
where the ultimate purchaser was in no way a party to the original sale . ...
However, there is a growing number of cases, which, as an exception to thegeneral rule,
hold that as to food stuffs and medicines . . . a warranty of fitness for humanconsumption
carries over from the manufacturer or producer to the ultimate consumer, regardless of
privity of contract . ...
It would seem but logical to extend the rule last cited to cosmetics and other prepara-
tions, which are sold in sealed packages and are designed for application to the bodies of
humans or animals.
Id. at 246-47, 147 N.E.2d at 614.
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product fails to conform to the representations made about its qualities,
lack of privity should not bar suit against the manufacturer who made such
express warranties. Thus, the buyer's cause of action arose through her
proven reliance on the seller's express representations about the product
that caused her injuries, rather than solely through the shortcomings of the
product itself. The court did, however, characterize the express warranty
recovery as a tort-based mode of redress, and not a contractual one bound
up with notions of privity, correctly pointing out that the action on a
breach of warranty originally sounded in tort as a means to give relief for
the breach of a duty assumed by a seller.63
Although the dam restraining the onslaught of strict liability had
sprung a considerable leak after Rogers,64 it refused to buckle until 1960
when the Supreme Court of New Jersey handed down the now famous
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.65 The New.lersey Supreme Court
held both the manufacturer and the retailer of an automobile liable to the
purchaser's wife, who was injured when the car suddenly veered into a wall,
without any showing of privity or negligence. Finding the same potential
for harm in "a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile, 66 the
court refused to hQnor any distinction between the two. Still phrasing the
basis for recovery in terms of an "implied warranty," the court extended
protection to Mrs. Henningsen, despite the fact that she was completely
outside the chain of title, reasoning that privity barriers should not
preclude a suit by an injured product user against a seller of a product that
could be dangerous to life or limb when defectively made,67 because an
"implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use . . . accompanies
[such a product] into the hands of the ultimate purchaser.""
Henningsen did not, however, establish a new tort-based theory
divorced from rules of contract law, for recovery was still premised upon
the breach of an implied warranty. Although originally sounding in tort,
an action for breach of warranty had by this time been held to lie in
contract,69 and so recovery was allowed according to contract law princi-
ples. These rules made recovery difficult, and the court in Henningsen was
put to some toil to hold that a warranty disclaimer included in the contract
was void as a matter of law by reason of unconscionability, 70 and therefore
could not bar plaintiff's action.
63. Id. at 247-48, 147 N.E.2d at 614-15.
64. See, e.g., Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So 2d
40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,
90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Jarnot v. Ford Motor
Co., 191 Pa. Super. Ct. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959).
65. 32N.J. 358, 161 A.2d69(1960).
66. Id. at 383, 161 A.2d at 83.
67. Id. at 413, 161 A.2d at 99-100.
68. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
69. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1126-34; Prosser, 'The Fall, supra note 3, at 801.
70. 32 N.J. at 385-406, 161 A.2d at 84-96.
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These problems were finally eliminated by the Supreme Court of
California in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,7 in which plaintiff
recovered for injuries suffered when he was struck by a piece of wood
thrown from his new "Shopsmith" machine. The court rejected the
manufacturer's contention that plaintiff's action was barred by his failure
to give notice of the alleged breach of warranty within a "reasonable time,"
as required by California law,72 holding that the notice requirement was
not applicable "in actions by injured consumers against manufacturers
with whom they have not dealt. '73 The manufacturer's liability was not
limited by contract or warranty rules, but rather was grounded strictly in
tort law:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being. . . .Although in these
cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the aban-
donment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that
the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law ( ...Rogers
v. Toni Home Permanent Co. . . .) and the refusal to permit the manufac-
turer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products
(Henningsen v. Bloonfield Motors, Inc. . . .) make clear that the liability is
not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort.74
Judicial acceptance of the tort-based "strict liability" action was explo-
sive,75 and by 1964 the American Law Institute had approved it as the
majority rule in section 402A.76
Although many courts have wrestled with strict products liability
doctrine since its inception in Greenman, they have reached no consensus
on the components of a strict products liability suit. Yet certain basic
principles have emerged, and it may generally be said that in order to
recover upon a theory of strict liability in tort, the plaintiff must establish
71. 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
72. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1769 (West 1973).
73. 59 Cal. 2d at 61, 377 P.2d at 900,27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
74. Id. at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
75. See Prosser, The Fall, supra note 3, at 793-800.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to this property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
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that: (1) the defendant placed the product upon the market knowing that it
would be used without inspection for defects; (2) the product as sold was
defective 77 and unreasonably dangerous;78 (3) the product is expected to
and does reach the user without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold; and (4) the defective condition complained of was the
proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff.79  Thus, proper strict
liability analysis focuses on the product itself as sold, and is not
premised upon an assessment of the manufacturer's or seller's duty of care;
indeed, strict liability is imposed although "the seller has exercised all
possible care." 80
Despite the christening of a strict tort liability cause of action in the
Greenman case, the adoption of its rationale in many jurisdictions, and its
subsequent recognition in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the Ohio courts balked at acceptance of the strict tort doctrine and
refused to further erode privity requirements.8 Absent privity, the
consumer could proceed against a seller in a negligence suit only if the
injury-causing product was inherently dangerous or had become immi-
nently so at the time it left the seller's hands because of his negligence. An
action based upon an express warranty sounding in tort pursuant to the
Rogers case obviated the necessity of making a showing of privity where
the plaintiff could show that the damage resulted from reliance upon
representations made by the seller in the course of expressly warranting its
82product. But Ohio retained the rule that recovery upon an implied
warranty claim required a showing by the injured party that he was in
privity with the party subjected to the implied warranty, 83 except to the
extent that the Uniform Commercial Code broadened warranty
77. It may generally be said that a product is"defective" if it is not reasonably fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such a product is used and sold, or that it is unsafe for the purpose intended. See
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42111. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969): Stammer v. General
Motors Corp., 123 I11. App. 2d 316,259 N.E.2d 352 (1970); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev, 408,
470 P.2d 135 (1970); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,207 A,2d 305 (1965). Sec also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comments g & h (1965). There ha. been, however, no
concrete and final exposition of what constitutes a "defect" for strict liability purposes: rather, the
definition of the term has largely been dealt with on a case-by-ease basis. See Traynor, supra note 5.
78. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "unreasonably dungerous" as "dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with tile
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." For example. ordinary
whiskey is not "unreasonably dangerous" because it makes one drunk, but whiskey contaminated with
fuel oil will undoubtedly be unreasonably dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SLCOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
Comment i (1965).
79. 1 R. HURsH&H. BAILEY,supranote8,§4:l0.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1965).
81. Yount v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 324(6th Cir. 1963 1: Tomle v. New York Cent, R,
R., 234 F. Supp. 101 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Miller v. Chrysler Corp., 90 Ohio L. Abs. 317, 183 N.E.2d 421
(Ohio Ct. App. Cuyahoga County 1962).
82. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.. 167 Ohio St. 244. 147 N.E,2d 612 (1958): Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965),
83. Miller v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 90 Ohio L. Abs. 317. 183 NE.2d 421 (Ohio Ct, App.




protection.8 4 Ohio law stood in this uncertain posture when the Supreme
Court of Ohio handed down its next major opinion in the products liability
area.
B. Lonzrick and the "hnplied Warranty in Tort"
Cause of Action in Ohio
With its opinion in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,8 5 the Supreme
Court of Ohio clarified some of the confusion about the requirement of
privity in products liability suits. For the first time, Ohio law recognized
that a manufacturer of goods could be liable in negligence for injury-
causing shortcomings in its products without a showing of privity between
plaintiff and manufacturer. Furthermore, the court repudiated its pre-
vious holdings, and allowed a subcontractor's employee, injured by steel
roof joists falling from overhead, to proceed on a theory of "implied
warranty in tort" directly against the manufacturer of thejoists, which had
been sold to the general contractor. Divorced from traditional modes of
products liability recovery in negligence and warranty, an "implied
warranty in tort" could be the basis for imposition of liability upon a
manufacturer who sells a defective product that proximately causes injury
to a person whose presence the manufacturer could reasonably anticipate,
despite the complete absence of privity between the manufacturer and the
injured party.
The Lonzrick court found it unjust to confine the protection of the
consumer to only those situations in which the manufacturer has expressly
warranted its product through media advertisements and the injured user
has relied upon those representations in purchasing the product, as in
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co. While acknowledging the sound-
ness of allowing the purchaser to recover when he has been injured because
the product failed to reflect the representations of quality that had induced
the purchaser to buy the product in the first instance, the court rejected the
proposition that the user's failure to rely upon such an express affirmation
of product quality should bar recovery. The court posited these elements
as necessary for the successful assertion of an implied warranty in tort
claim: (1) that a defect existed in the product manufactured and sold by the
defendant; (2) that the defect existed in the product at the time of sale; (3)
that at the time of injury the goods were being used for their ordinary
intended purpose; (4) that the defect was the direct and proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injury; and (5) that at the time of injury the plaintiff was in a
place which the defendant could reasonably anticipate.8 6 Subsequent
decisions of the court recognized that the implied warranty in tort action
84. See notes 37-41 and accompanying text supra. See also Jenkins, The Product Liability of
Manufacturers: An Understanding and Exploration, 4 AK:RON L. REV. 135, 142 n.27 (1971).
85. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,218 N.E. 2d 185 (1966).
86. Id. at 237,218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
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could permit recovery even if the manufacturer exercised all possible care,
and that the claimant could recover without showing negligence or a lack
of reasonable care on the part of the defendant.87 In defining what a
"defect" is, the court relied heavily upon the concept of a warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code,8 asserting a
product is to be considered defective when it is not "of good and
merchantable quality and safe for . . . [its] ordinary intended use."8 9
Thus, the Ohio courts eroded privity requirements in suits against
manufacturers by consumers injured by unsafe products. Important
strides had been taken by the Lonzrick court in meeting some of the
privity-related deficiencies of existing modes of recovery, but subsequent
readings of Lonzrick suggested curious discrepancies between Ohio's
"implied warranty in tort" action and prevailing strict products liability
doctrine.
C. "Implied Warrant, in Tort" vs. Strict Products Liability
Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Although the Lonzrick case has often been construed as the origin of
the strict products liability action in Ohio,90 it is significant to note that the
Supreme Court did not so designate this new cause of action, despite the
recognition of the court of appeals that this new theory should be termed
strict tort liability and that the use of the term "warranty" was improper.
9
'
Nor did the court adopt section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts as its standard in strict products liability suits, although the Lonzrick
and Restatement theories share several similar elements.92 These omis-
sions may be viewed merely as an oversight, but the decisions in Ohio show
that there may exist important practical differences between these theories
of recovery.
87. Gast v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 39 Ohio St. 2d 29,31,313 N.E.2d 831,833 (1974),
88. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.27(B) (Page 1962); U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (1972) provides:
"(B) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ... (3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used ....
89. 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,231,218 N.E.2d 185, 188-89(1974).
90. Gast v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 39 Ohio St. 2d 29,313 N.E.2d 831 (1974); State Auto, Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 36 Ohio St. 2d 151, 304 N.E.2d 891 (1973), Groves v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 22 Ohio App. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 759 (Summit County 1969); Jenkins, supra note 84. at 161:
Prosser, The Fall, supra note 3, at 795; Note, supra note 12, at 554-56; Recent Develop-
ments, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 159 (1967).
91. Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., I Ohio App. 2d 374, 384, 205 N.E.2d 92, 99 (Cuyahoga
County 1965).
92. As outlined in Jenkins, supra note 84, at 161:
The other elements of section 402A are similar to the elements of the implied warranty
theory described in Lonzrick. The common aspects are (1) all products are encompassed, (2)
the product must be defective, (3) the defect must have existed at the time the product left the
control of the defendant, (4) the product must have been being used as intended, (5) the defect
must have proximately caused the injury, (6) liability may result although all possible care has





The Lonzrick theory of recovery and strict products liability under
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A differ with respect to the
parties that could potentially be held liable. The Lonzrick opinion
fashions rules applicable to a party repeatedly called a "manufacturer-
seller," and subsequent decisions have dealt with implied warranty in tort
claims asserted exclusively against nonprivy sellers who are manufactur-
ers.93 The Lonzrick opinion does not authorize an implied warranty in
tort suit against other nonprivy sellers, and Ohio law has not yet extended
the theory that far. The Restatement imposes strict liability upon "[o]ne
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
S. . ," and the comments make it clear that liability can be extended to
manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and distributor alike.94  It seems
certain that recovery against other nonprivy sellers in Ohio, however,
could be had pursuant only to theories of negligence and contractual
warranty.
Language in Lonzrick and subsequent Ohio decisions suggests a more
fundamental difference between implied warranty in tort recovery in Ohio
and strict liability theory. The Lonzrick opinion decried the denial of
recovery against manufacturers of unsafe products on the basis of "out-
moded and irrelevant concepts of privity." 5  Curiously enough, the
opinion makes no mention of the notice, disclaimer, and limitation of
liability sections of the Uniform Commercial Code,96 which had also
frustrated attempts at redress of the injuries caused by defective products.
It has been suggested that the Lonzrick decision was addressed only to the
privity problem in products liability cases, and that the implied warranty in
tort remedy could be utilized by an injured user of a chattel only in an
action against a party with whom he was not in privity. To seek recovery
from a party with whom the injured party was in privity, the plaintiff could
look only to the substance of his contract and the provisions of Ohio's
version of the Uniform Commercial Code.97 A strict products liability
claim under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, however,
is simply another theory of recovery available against any seller, regardless
of privity." In an appropriate situation, claims under contractual war-
ranty theory and under strict products liability theory could be joined
93. See lacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975). State
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 36 Ohio St. 2d 151. 304 N.E.2d 891 (1973): United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244. 257 N.E.2d 380 (1970);
Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150,324 N.E.2d 583 (Cuyahoga County 1974);
Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141. 275 N.E.2d 632 (Williams County 1971).
94. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS §402A (1) & Comment f(1965).
95. 6 Ohio St. 2d at234,218 N.E.2d at 190.
96. See notes 20-31 and accompanying text supra.
97. See Note, Recovery of Direct Economic Loss: 7he Unanswered Questions ofrOhio Products
Liability Law, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 683,709-17 (1977).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTs § 402A, Comments f& m (1965).
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against a seller with whom the injured party was in privity; the two are not
to be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives, the former to be pressed
if privity is present, the latter if privity is absent, as seems to be possible in
Ohio.
The holding of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County in Avenell
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.99 substantiates the view that Lonzrick
prescribes parallel but exclusive theories. The insurance subrogees of an
electric utility company sought recovery from the manufacturer of an
allegedly defective generator, with whom the utility company was in
privity, for economic losses resulting from the breakdown caused by the
generator, namely loss of sales during the breakdown and costs incurred in
providing electricity during that period. Claims made by the plaintiff
based upon the contract between the utility company and the defendant
were deemed futile by the court, since the defendant had effectively
disclaimed any implied warranties pursuant to section 2-316(2) of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 00 and had also effectively excluded liability
for consequential damages under section 2-719(3)'l0 of the Code.10 2 The
court then refused recovery upon an implied warranty in tort, cautioning
that the doctrine of implied warranty in tort should not displace provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, which permitted buyers and sellers to
negotiate and settle by contract their rights and remedies in regard to
liability for defective products. The court held that when two sophisticat-
ed buyers dealing at arm's length agree to an exclusion of liability for
consequential damages, those damages should not be recoverable upon an
implied warranty in tort claim, because "[i]mplied warranty in tort is
ordinarily applied where the purchaser is not in privity with the seller."''
1
The manufacturer-seller of a product was in essence allowed to disclaim
liability under a theory of implied warranty in tort, while the
manufacturer-seller clearly has no such power to disclaim strict liability in
tort. 0 4 Whatever its subsequent application, Avenell illustrates Ohio's
bifurcated approach, which makes privity the initial determinant of
products liability theories available to the plaintiff.
2. Recoverable Damages
A final difference between implied warranty in tort recovery and
prevailing strict products liability theory turns upon the types of damages
potentially recoverable. The damages recoverable in a products liability
suit can be grouped into three broad categories. The use of a defective
99. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150,324 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
100. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.29 (Page 1962).
101. Id. § 1302.93.
102. 41 Ohio App. 2d at 152-56,324 N.E.2d at 585-87.
103. Id. at 158, 324 N.E.2d at 589.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
(Vol. 39:586
OHIO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
product may result in damages for personal injuries'05 or "property
damage," which connotes the physical injury to an object, resulting from
damage caused by the product. 0 6 A third possible component of damages
ih a products liability case is "economic loss," which represents a pecuniary
loss suffered by a consumer. Economic loss refers to diminished value of
the product as a result of its defectiveness ("direct" economic loss), and
further loss caused by that loss of product value, such as lost profits or loss
of goodwill ("indirect" economic loss).107 "Direct" economic loss is
measurable as the difference between the value of the defective product and
the value it would have had if not defective.'0 8
Traditionally, the rule has been that an injured party could recover in
tort negligence suits for personal injury and property damage, but not for
purely economic losses,'0 9 which would be recoverable only in a suit upon a
contract against a party with whom he was in privity to recover the benefit
of his bargain n1 and reasonably foreseeable consequential damages,"'
which correspond to the "direct" and "indirect" economic losses described
above. Problems arise, however, in determining whether physical damage
to the defective chattel itself is "property damage" recoverable in a tort suit
or an "economic loss" recoverable only in a suit on the contract or under
the Uniform Commercial Code warranty provisions. American courts
have been willing to regard damage to a chattel as a result of a defect in the
chattel introduced by the manufacturer's negligence as "property damage"
recoverable in a negligence suit against the manufacturer, when the
damage is caused by a violent, dramatic accident.'"2  The injury is,
however, characterized as "economic loss" when the damage is merely a
noncatastrophic deterioration of the product because of the defect; for
such a loss the buyer must look to his contractual remedies. If an
automobile catches fire and is destroyed because of the manufacturer's
105. The potentially recoverable damages for personal injuries include: (1) medical expenses; (2)
pain, suffering, and embarassment; (3) lost earnings; and (4) permanent impairment of earning.
capacity.
106. See Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Products
Liability, 27 CASE W. Ras. L. REV. 647,651 (1977). See also Zammit, 3Manufacturers' Responsibility
for Economic Loss Damages in Products Liability Cases: What Result in New York?, 20 N.Y.L.F. 81,
82(1974).
107. See Edmeades, supra note 106, at651. See also Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 917,918 (1966).
108. See Note, Recovery of Direct Economic Loss: The Unanswered Questions of Ohio
Products Liability Law, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 683 (1977). See generally Comment, The Vexing
Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability:An Injury in Search ofa Remedv,4 SrTo.v
HALL L. REV. 145 (1972); Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasersfor "Economic
Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966).
109. See, e.g., Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 CaL App. 2d 863,323 P.2d227(1958); VWattv.
Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956); Amodeo v. Autocraft Hudson,
Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1959), af'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 499, 207 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1960). See also W.
PROSSER, supra note 7, § I01, at 665-67.
110. See, e.g., Boylston Hous. Corp. v. O'Toole, 321 Mass. 538, 74 N.E.2d 288 (1947).
111. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. Ch. 1854).
112. See Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863,323 P.2d 227 (1958).
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negligence in designing the electrical system, the loss is "property damage";
premature rusting of an automobile because of a defect in the painting
process is mere "economic loss."
Although contemporary products liability doctrine permits a manu-
facturer to be held liable for personal injury and property damage resulting
from its negligence in production and marketing, regardless of privity,
t1 4
recovery for economic losses unaccompanied by personal injury or
property damage cannot be had in tort in a negligence suit. This rule was
recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Inglis v. American Motors
Corp.
t15
In Seely v. White Motor Co.,116 the California Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Traynor, t 17 refused to allow recovery
under a theory of strict products liability for economic losses sustained
when plaintiff purchased a defective truck. The court instead premised
recovery for the purchase price paid and for lost profits upon the express
warranty made by the manufacturer of the truck. Traynor pointed out
that strict liability theory had developed primarily to displace the inade-
quacies of sales law in protecting consumers from physical injury. The
Uniform Commercial Code was designed to adjust the rights of parties
when economic loss arises in a commercial transaction. When the
product fails to meet contract specifications ("direct" economic loss) and
its deficiencies cause loss of profits ("indirect" economic loss), the Uniform
Commercial Code is wholly adequate to meet the needs of parties to
commercial transactions." 8 Moreover, if strict liability in tort were held
to lie for economic losses, the parties would not be free to bargain for the
standard of quality to be observed by the manufacturer; strict liability
standards would pre-empt such an agreement, and subject the manufactur-
,, ,,119
er to damages of "unknown and unlimited scope," in spite of the
agreement of the parties. Because disclaimer of strict tort liability is not
possible, the parties would be deprived of an opportunity to adjust
commercial losses as they wished pursuant to the Code. 120
The Seely Court also recognized that the policy rationale of strict
products liability' 2' does not compel that the manufacturer be held strictly
liable for commercial losses visited upon the consumer because of a
113. See Edmeades, supra note 106, at 651-52.
114. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
115. 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 140-41,209 N.E.2d 583,588 (1965).
116. 63 Cal. 2d 9,403 P.2d 145,45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
117. It is significant that Chief Justice Traynor wrote this opinion, since he was the earliest
advocate of the strict liability cause of action and a leading proponent in its adoption. SeeGreenman
v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring),
118. 63 Cal. 2d at 16, 403 P.2d at 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
119. Id. at 17,403 P.2d at 150-51,45 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
120. Id. at 16,403 P.2d at 150,45 Cal. Rptr. at 22. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1972).
121. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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defective product. Although strict tort liability is founded upon a concern
to prevent human suffering from defective products, the court pointed out
that economic loss is not so devastating as physical impairment.' 22
Furthermore, whatever policy justification there may be for distributing
the risk of physical injury attendant to the use of a product among all users
in the form of higher prices, there is littlejustification for redistributing the
risk of one consumer's unfulfilled contractual expectations among other
consumers.1
23
The Seely holding that economic losses should not be recoverable in a
strict tort liability action appears to be the emerging rule in most states.1
24
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A provides that strict
liability will attach for "physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property,"' 25 and makes no mention of economic
loss.
It is clear that recovery of economic losses can be had by a wronged
buyer by means of a suit based upon the contract against any seller with
whom he is in privity. 26 Such a suit would be governed in most states by
the Uniform Commercial Code, which, in addition to any express warran-
ties made by a seller, implies certain warranties 2 7 in any sale made by a
merchant.' 2t  Unless these warranties are effectively excluded or mod-
ified 29 or the available remedies are limited or modified,30 the buyer can
recover as damages for breach of an express or implied warranty the
difference in value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted,' 3' and so recoup any direct economic
loss. Indirect economic loss may be recovered as an incidental or
consequential damage under the Code. 32 Recovery for economic losses
has also been allowed in the absence of privity pursuant to the Code
warranty provisions, when the manufacturer of goods has made an express
122. 63 Cal. 2d at 18-19,403 P.2d at 151,45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
123. Id. at 19,403 P.2dat 151,45 CaI. Rptr. at23.
124. See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Noel Transfer &
Package Delivery Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F. Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972); Miehle Co. v.
Smith-Brooks Printing Co., 303 F. Supp. 501 (D. Colo. 1969); Beauchamp v. Wilson,21 Ariz. App. 14,
515 P.2d 41 (1973); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey. 472
S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND.
L. REv. 231, 232 (1966); Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Erpectancy: The Case for
Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664,685-88 (1964). But see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J.
52,207 A.2d 305 (1965); Edmeades, supra note 106, at 65 1.
125. RESTATEINSENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965) (emphasis added).
126. See note 110 supra.
127. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314,2-315 (1972).
128. Defined id. §2-104(1).
129. See id. §2-316.
130. See id. § 2-719.
131. Seeid. §2-714(2).
132. See id. § 2-715.
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warranty that has been brought to the attention of the buyer who
purchases from a middleman-dealer.
133
Although the Ohio courts at one point conformed to the majority rule
and refused recovery of economic losses upon a theory of implied warranty
in tort,134 the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Iacono v. Anderson
Concrete Corp. 35 allowed recovery for direct economic losses upon a
theory of implied warranty in tort, suggesting a discrepancy between strict
tort liability and the hybrid Lonzrick doctrine. Affirming a judgment in
favor of plaintiff homeowner against the manufacturer of concrete used by
a contractor in installing a driveway, the court purported to redress
"property damage,"' 36 but the loss to the plaintiff was purely economic.
Due to defects in the concrete, the driveway developed small holes and
was generally deteriorating when the first freeze occurred some five months
after installation. 37  There was no accident or catastrophic occurrence
resulting in sudden damage to the driveway, and so the damage was direct
economic loss. Nevertheless, the court used a tort theory to redress
economic losses that would not be recoverable under prevailing strict
products liability law.3 8  In light of the court's questionable characteriza-
tion of the loss as "property damage,"'139 however, it is debatable whether
the court deliberately caused Ohio's doctrine of "implied warranty in tort"
to depart from prevailing strict tort liability law with respect to recovery
for economic losses.
Lonzrick resolved some issues concerning products liability, but
raised other issues. Clearly, the injured product user was relieved of the
burdensome requirement of showing privity as a prerequisite to recovery
in negligence against the manufacturer of that product. Perhaps more
importantly, however, the Rogers warranty in tort suit, contingent upon
the making of express representations by the defendant, had been super-
seded by a new "implied warranty in tort" cause of action, which subse-
quently developed into a species of strict products liability that was both
more and less consumer-protective than the predominant American
variety.
The implied warranty in tort action bestowed on consumers a new
133. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965)
(automobile); Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 Il1. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E,2d 726
(1966) (aerosol can); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965)
(automobile).
134. Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (Cuyahoga
County 1974).
135. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
136. Id. at 92-93, 326 N.E.2d at 270-71.
138. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
139. It should be noted that the lacono court cited with approval Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132,209 N.E.2d 583(1965). The Inglis decision had previously held that recovery
in a tort suit based upon negligence for economic losses was not possible, yet allowed recovery of direct
economic losses upon an express warranty made by the remote mantfacturer, despite the absence of
privity between the manufacturer and the injured buyer. Reliance on Inglis for recovery of economic
losses in tort seems misplaced, although the rationale of Inglis is unclear.
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products liability theory that more easily admitted of proof, because it did
not saddle plaintiffs with the troublesome burden of proving privity with
and a lack of reasonable care on the part of the manufacturer. Subsequent
interpretations of Lonzrick suggested that the implied warranty in tort
cause of action allowed the consumer recovery of "economic losses"
attributable to defective products, which are not recoverable under
prevailing strict products liability doctrine.
In two respects, however, Ohio's implied warranty in tort suit was
developing into a more confining theory than strict products liability.
First, among a chain of sellers who distributed the product for profit, the
manufacturer alone appeared to be a proper defendant in an implied
warranty in tort suit in Ohio. Second, privity remained a criterion for the
new cause of action, but assumed a nontraditional function: The presence
of privity between plaintiff and the defendant became a basis for dismissal
of the implied warranty in tort claim.
The ambiguities in Ohio law began to surface in the wake of Rogers
and became still more conspicuous following Lonzrick. Temple v. Wean
United, Inc. 140 represents the latest attempt by the Supreme Court of Ohio
to clarify Ohio products liability law.
III. THE Temple OPINION
A. The Facts
The Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Temple v. Wean United,
Inc.14 1 had its genesis in 1972. Plaintiff Beverly Temple was operating a
seventy-five ton power press at her place of employment when aluminum
extractions fell from the bolster plate in front of her onto the dual
operating buttons located at waist level, causing the press to close on her
arms. Both of plaintiff's hands and forearms were crushed and required
amputation.
42
The new press had been sold by Wean United in 1954 to General
Motors Corporation, and subsequently passed through an intermediary
to the plaintiff's employer, Superior Metal Products, Inc.'43 The
starter buttons had been placed by the manufacturer at shoulder level,
but plaintiff's employer had repositioned them at waist level, facing
up.' 44 The plaintiff brought suit against General Motors, the manu-
facturer of the starter buttons, and Wean United on theories of negli-
gence, implied warranty, and strict liability in tort. 45 The supreme court
140. 50 Ohio St. 2d 317,364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 318,364 N.E.2d at 269.
143. Id.
144. Id. at318-19,364 N.E.2d at 269.
145. Id. at 320,364 N.E.2d at 270.
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By a four to three majority, 141 the court brought Ohio into the ranks of
American jurisdictions that have adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A as the standard of strict products liability. 48  This holding
may resolve considerably the ambiguity in Ohio's "implied warranty in
tort" law. The previous refusal of the Supreme Court of Ohio to adopt the
strict liability in tort label suggested that the court perceived important
substantive differences between the two theories. In a more substantive
sense, the adoption of section 402A should serve to establish that
nonmanufacturing middlemen, that is, retailers, wholesalers, and
distributors, may be subjected to a stricter form of liability than
negligence. 49  The court's approval of the "numerous illustrative
comments"' 50 to section 402A suggests that Ohio courts should abide by
those comments,15' and extend the scope of strict tort liability to original
manufacturers and middlemen alike. 52  Such strict tort liability would be
146. Id. at 328-29, 364 N.E.2d at 274.
147. Three justices, including the late Chief Justice O'Neill, the author of the opinion In
Lonzrick, refused to join in paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, which quote nearly verbatim §
402A. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice O'Neill contended that the approval of § 402A was
unnecessary to the decision of the case. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 328-29, 364 N.E.2d at 274 (O'Neill, C,,
concurring). Given the court's determinations that the press sold by Wean United and General
Motors was not defective in any way and that the alteration by plaintiff's employer was the "sole,
responsible cause" of the accident, 50 Ohio St. 2d at 323, 364 N.E.2d at 271, the ChiefJustice was
probably correct in his implicit assumption that the defendants would not be liable under either Ohio's
"implied warranty in tort" or strict liability. Thus, it may well have been uninecessary to the decision to
adopt § 402A strict liability as Ohio's standard of liability.
Presumably, the Chief Justice doubted the validity of the majority's assertion that Ohio's version
of "implied warranty in tort" and strict tort liability under § 402A are "virtually indistinguishable," 50
Ohio St. 2d at 320, 364 N.E.2d at 270, a doubt that this Note suggests is reasonable, No decision.
however, has positively established any substantive differences between the two theories, The
confusing discrepancies have arisen from the reluctance of the courts to expand the reach of the
"implied warranty in tort" doctrine beyond the facts of the individual case and extend the potential for
recovery as far as strict products liability might allow. The Chief Justice may technically have been
correct, but from a policy standpoint the majority seems to have made a valuable contribution to 01110
products liability law by adopting a more certain standard of liability, upon which business decisions
can be based.
148. See the cases collected at 50 Ohi6 St. 2d at 322 n.3, 364 N.E.2d at 271 n3.
149. See notes 93-104 and accompanying text supra.
150. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 322, 364 N.E.2d at 271.
151. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f(1965).
152. The extension of strict tort liability to wholesalers, distribators, and retailers is supported
by the same policy justifications that bolster the imposition of strict lability in tort upon the original
manufacturer. These middlemen, like the manufacturer, are engaged in the business of producing and
marketing goods, and, as an integral part of this commercial enterprise, should bear the cost of injuries
resulting from defective products. The retailer may be the only party available to the injured plaintiff,
and may play a substantial role in assuring product safety or may be able to exert pressure upon the
manufacturer to do so. Moreover, no undue burden is imposed upon these middlemen, who can
distribute the costs of protecting against these risks among themselves, the manufacturer, and tile
purchaser. See cases cited at Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057, § 10[c] & [d] (1967). Srealso63 Am. Jtit,
2D Products Liability §§ 148, 149 (1972). It should be noted that the cases have not settled the question
whether strict liability recovery will be permitted against a retailer of a product that has been sealed
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imposed regardless of privity, and dicta, such as that in Avenell v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'53 indicating that an injured plaintiff could
not look to a stricter form of liability than negligence in a suit against a
party with whom he was in privity would be superseded.154  Although the
emerging view appears to be that economic losses are not recoverable in a
strict products liability action in the absence of personal injury,' 5" some
courts have reached contrary results on this issue; 56 it is thus debatable
whether the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Iacono v. Anderson
Concrete Corp. 57 allowing recovery upon a theory of implied warranty in
tort of what were actually economic losses under the name "property
damage" will continue to be good law.15 8  Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts makes it clear that strict products liability
claims do not present some of the difficulties associated with other
products liability theories that have reduced their utility to the consumer.
The Restatement specifically recognizes that the contributory negligence
of a plaintiff does not bar his strict products liability action, t59 and the
courts have largely so held. 60  Under strict products liability doctrine,
there is no duty to notify the seller of the alleged defect, the breach of which
would bar the plaintiff from recovery.' 6' Nor can a seller disclaim strict
products liability, because that liability is founded upon the existence of a
defective product and not upon the representations made or disclaimed in
the bargaining process.
62
before reaching the retailer and is resold in that condition. Comment f to § 402A would seem to
authorize such a recovery.as long as the retailer was in the business of selling such products, but the
courts have been reluctant to impose strict liability in this situation. See, e.g.,McLeodv.W.S.Merrel
Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
153. 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974). See notes 93-104 and accompanying text
supra.
154. See cases cited at note 152 supra.
155. See. e.g., Seelyv. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9,403 P.2d 145,45 Cal. Rptr. 17(1965). See
also notes 105-33 and accompanying text supra.
156. See, e.g., Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,207 A.2d 305 (1965).
157. 42 Ohio St. 2d 88,326 N.E.2d 267 (1975).
158. See notes 134-39 and accompanying text supra.
159. RESTATEIE r (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965). That Comment does
recognize, however, that a plaintiffis barred from recovery when he discovers a defect and knows of the
danger presented, yetvoluntarily and unreasonably proceeds to encountersuch known danger by using
the product. This defense is commonly known as an assumption of the risk. See W. PRoss, sttpra
note7, § 68,at440. Also, somejurisdictions have injected comparative negligence principles into strict
products liability cases by considering the plaintiff's own lack of reasonable care in assessing
recoverable damages in strict products liability suits, although that lack of care will not bar the
plaintiff's action. See Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability: Butaud v.
Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 38 OHio ST. L.J. 883 (1977).
160. The courts generally agree that contributory negligence in the sense of a failure to discover
or guard against product defects is not a defense to an action based upon strict products liability in tort.
See cases collected in Annot.. 46 A.L.R.3d 240 § 4[b] (1972). Other courts have taken a broader Vie%
and held that the plaintiff's negligence in failing to exercise ordinary reasonable care for his own safety
is not a bar to a strict products liability action. See cases collected in Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 § 4[a]
(1972).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
162. See, e.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1974);
Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co.,
237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256,391 P.2d 168,37
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The Temple opinion is also significant for the limitations it imposes on
the liability of the manufacturer and subsequent vendees. The courts have
recognized that strict liability does not require a manufacturer or seller of a
product to insure that no injury will result from the use of the product. 6 3
Thus, the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion in showing that the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous when it left the seller's
hands, 164 that the defective product was the proximate cause of injuries to
himself, 65 and that the product reached the plaintiff without substantial
change in its condition.1 66 The term "substantial change" is one laden with
uncertainty. It is difficult to determine in a given case whether alteration
of a product after its placement in the stream of commerce can operate to
cut off the liability of a prior manufacturer or seller.167 The court absolved
Wean United and General Motors as a matter of law of strict products
liability on the ground that there was no defect in the product as originally
manufactured and then sold by Wean United and General Motors and that
the alteration of the machine by the plaintiff's employer was the "sole
responsible cause" of the accident. 6  The court aptly resolved the
situation in which it is most apparent that a manufacturer or seller should
not be held strictly liable in tort: when the accident would not have
occurred had the machine remained in the condition in which it was sold
and the alterations by a subsequent user were the sole cause of the accident.
In such a situation, the plaintiff has failed to allege or produce evidence of
facts sufficient to show two necessary elements of the plaintiff's strict
products liability case, namely, that there was a defect in the product at the
time it was placed in the stream of commerce by the seller and that the
product reached the plaintiff without substantial change in the condition in
which it was sold.1 69 Given such a clear set of facts, the supreme court was
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal,
Rptr. 697 (1963); Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 134 N.W.2d 730 (1965); Velet v,
Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750 350 N.Y.S,2d 617 (1973). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
163. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Shramek v. General
Motors Corp., 69 II1. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 45 N.J. 434,212 A.2d 769 (1965); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967),
164. See cases cited at 63 Am. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 129 (1972).
165. See cases cited at 63 Ami. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 135 (1972),
166. Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973); Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp,. 370 F.
Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556,447 P.2d 248 (1968); Bradford v,
Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99. 517 P.2d 406 (1973); Rossignal v,
Danbury School of Aero., Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967); Cornette v. Sarjcant Metal Prod,
Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46,258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
167. See Comment, Substantial Change: Alteration of a Product as a Bar to a Mantifacturers
Strict Liability, 80 DICK. L. REV. 245 (1975).
168. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 323,364 N.E.2d at 271.
169. For a sampling of cases in which the manufacturer or seller was so clearly free of liability,
and in which the decision was often reached by summary judgment or directed verdict, see Hanlon v.
Cyril Bath Co., 541 F.2d 343 (3d Cir. 1975); Hardy v. Hull Corp., 446 F,2d 34 (9th Cir. 1971);
Southwire v. Beloit E. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Martinez v. Nichols Conv'r & Engr,
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able to expressly adopt the consumer-protective strict products liability
cause of action, simultaneously resolving problems associated with its
"implied warranty in tort" doctrine and marking definitively a line
beyond which the manufacturer can rest assured that strict products
liability will not reach. Undoubtedly, more difficulties for the Ohio courts
will arise in defining the boundaries of potential liability of the manufac-
turer in strict tort for injury-causing products that are altered in some
fashion after sale.
170
IV. SHADES OF NEGLIGENCE IN
OHIO'S STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION
Despite its salutary effects, Temple contains elements that portend
troublesome confusion in sorting out the various theories of products
liability recovery. Temple can plausibly be read to suggest divergent
standards of strict products liability in scrutinizing possible manufactur-
ing, as opposed to design, defects, subjecting the latter to a more lenient
negligence-based standard. In part II of the opinion, the court held that
the alterations made by Mrs. Temple's employer were the "sole responsible
cause" of the accident, which, as a matter of law, absolved the original
manufacturer of strict tort liability.' 7' As recovery in strict tort liability
demands a showing that the defendant's actions have been the proximate
cause of injury to the plaintiff,' 72 the court correctly found that when such
subsequent alteration breaks the chain of causation between the defen-
dant's acts and the plaintiff's injuries, liability cannot be ascribed to the
original manufacturer. 73  By the same token, it is clearly the Ohio rule
that when an original manufacturer places a product upon the market and
a subsequent alteration of that product is the sole and proximate cause of
injury to a user, any liability on the part of the original manufacturer for
negligence is cut off.'74  In light of the court's holding that alterations to
243 Cal. App. 2d 795, 52 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1966); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods.. 147 Ind.
App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
170. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the difficulties inherent in determining -Ahether
subsequent alteration of a product amounts to "substantial change" that frees a prior manufacturer or
seller of strict tort liability. The term "substantial change" is a term ofart for the legal conclusion that
the alteration should be regarded as the proximate cause of an injury. Thus, a failure to prove that a
product has reached the user without "substantial change" is a failure to prove that any defect in the
product as sold by a particular defendant was the proximate cause of injury. As a consequence, the
problems of alteration are often bound up with problems of causation, which inevitably complicate
assessment of an original actor's potential liability when one or more acts have intervened between the
actor and the injury. Problems of alteration have been termed "a hazy area in strict liability." but the
determination whether substantial change has occurred in situations similar to that in Temple has been
termed by the same author "rather simple." Comment, supra note 167, at 246. 249.
171. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 323,364 N.E.2d at 271.
172. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
173. See Annot.,41 A.L.R.3d 1251(1972).
174. See, e.g., Keetv. Service Mach. Co.,472F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972); Brownv. General Motors
Corp., 355 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1966); Krysiak v. Acme Wire Co., 169 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ohio
1959); Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., Inc., 5 Ohio St. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 213 (1966):
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the punch press after it left the hands of Wean United were the "sole
responsible cause" of the injuries to the plaintiff, absolving the original
manufacturer of strict tort liability, it might be presumed that this
breakdown in causation would likewise free Wean United of liability in
negligence.
Nevertheless, in part III of the opinion, the court returned to the
question of the design responsibility of the original manufacturer. It
considered whether Wean United might be held liable for failing to
incorporate in its product design a "fixed barrier guard," which might well
have prevented the injuries to Mrs. Temple by precluding her from
inserting her hands into the space between the die and the ram. 7" The
court purported in part III to confine the discussion to only the allegation
of negligence made against the original manufacturer, implying that the
strict products liability issue was not under consideration. Examination
of this discussion in the context of the opinion as a whole nevertheless
reveals that the court necessarily assessed the potential liability of Wean
United for its failure to include a fixed barrier guard under theories of
negligence and strict tort liability. As suggested above, the court's finding
that the alterations by plaintiff's employer were the sole cause of the
accident would, in most instances, absolve the original manufacturer of
liability in negligence. By refusing to summarily absolve the original
manufacturer on the negligence count on the basis of superseding cause,
the court, although it gave no hint of its rationale, must implicitly have
confronted another aspect of the problem of superseding cause. Although
a subsequent alteration of a product may be the direct cause of an injury, it
is not necessarily the superseding cause of injury. Even when the
alteration of the product is the direct cause of an injury, the original
manufacturer may still be held liable in negligence, if the alteration was
reasonably foreseeable and the original manufacturer failed to design the
product so that it would remain safe after reasonably foreseeable altera-
tion. 116  Strict products liability doctrine is no less demanding in this
regard: An original manufacturer may similarly be held strictly liable in
spite of subsequent alteration, if that alteration could be deemed foresee-
able.1
77
Thus, the true inquiry in part III is whether the manufacturer's design
responsibility extended to foreseeing subsequent alteration by plaintiff's
employer and protecting against it by designing fixed barrier guards into
its punch press, although the court purported to consider only whether
Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co., 164 Ohio St. 323, 130 NE,2d 824 (1955). sce also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440 & 442 (1965).
175. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 325-27, 364 N.E.2d at 272-73.
176. See cases cited at note 174 supra.
177. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,391 P.2d 168,37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964); Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal. App. 2d 987,41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964); Ford Motor Co, v.
Russel & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 197 1); Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d
131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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Wean United was negligent in not including those guards. A manufactur-
er could be subjected to liability for product design on a theory either of
negligencet78 ot strict products liability.179  After introducing the issue
whether liability may attach because of the failure of Wean United to
design a press with a fixed barrier guard, the court went on to state this
proposition of law:
To date, no Ohio case has specifically defined the duties of a manufacturer
relative to product design, but the general rule is that". . . [i]t is the duty ofa
manufacturer to use reasonable care under the circumstances to so design his
product as to make it not accident or foolproof, but safe for the use for which
it is intended."'' 0
This "general rule" suggests the "reasonable man" standard of care
ordinarily imposed under negligence theory.18' The pronouncement of
this "general rule" may simply reflect the court's confusing characteriza-
tion of the issue in part III as involving solely the allegation of negligence.
Yet the court's general rule of "reasonable care" in product design may
indicate a more fundamental disposition of the court to subject
manufacturers to a less demanding standard than strict products liability
in the case of design, as opposed to manufacturing, defects in a product.182
The court lays down this standard of "reasonable care" for product design
in the face of its recognition in the syllabus of the opinion that strict
products liability attaches though the defendant has exercised "all possible
care."' 83 Such a bifurcated approach to strict products liability standards
for "design" and "manufacturing' 84 defects would be an unnecessary and
unfortunate deviatiornin Ohio strict products liability law.
The courts have not advanced a consistent policy reason for differen-
tiating between design defects and defects resulting from manufacture.18 5
178. RESTATENI,'T(SECO. D) OFTORTS § 398(1965).
179. Id. § 402A, Comments g & h.
180. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 326, 364 N.E.2d at 273 (quoting Gosset v. Chrysler Corp.,359 F.2d 84,87
(6th Cir. 1966)).
18 1. See W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 32, at 150.
182. Although such a departure would be radical, it would not be unprecedented. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals in Jones v. Hutchison ,Ifg. ine.. 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973). held that
assessing strict tort liability in the case of a defect in design is no different than doing so under
negligence theory, and the only demand made upon the manufacturer is to use reasonable care in the
development of the design. But see Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976). in
which the Court of Appeals retreated from this extreme view, promulgating a theory of strict tort
liability for design defects that was identical to the theory applicable to manufacturing defects.
183. 50 Ohio St. 2d at 317,364 N.E.2d at 269.
184. A "manufacturing" defect arises when a miscarriage in the production process results in an
individual item that fails to conform to an intended design. An example is a can ofsoup that contains a
dead rat. In the case of a "design" defect, however, the product is marketed in the precise form the
manufacturer intended, but suffers from an inadequacy that results in injury. The manufacturer will
be subjected to considerably more extensive liability in the case ofa"design" defect, since an entire line
of products may be found defective, rather than a single item that has become harmful because of
carelessness in the manufacturing process.
185. A primary rationale for the adoption of strict tort liability was to guard against the
unreasonable risk of injury to persons, and it is plain that this risk can be many times greater in the case
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The divergence has usually arisen from the inability of the courts to derive
a standard of design defectiveness that differs from traditional negligence
concepts. The application of reasonable care standards to determine
whether a manufacturer will be held strictly liable in tort for the design of a
product ignores the fundamental difference between strict tort law and
negligence law:
[T]he basic difference between negligence on the one hand and strict liability
for a design defect on the other, is that in strict liability we are talking about
the condition (dangerousness) of an article which is designed in a particular
way, while in negligence we are talking about the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's actions in designing and selling the article as he did. The
article can have a degree of dangerousness which the law of strict liability
will not tolerate even though the actions of the designer were entirely rea-
sonable in view of what he knew at the time he planned and sold the manu-
factured article.1
8 6
Under strict products liability law, the focus of consideration is the actual
condition of the product at the time of sale; considerations of the care
employed in preparing the product are inappropriate." 7
It is difficult to determine whether a particular product is in a
"defective condition . . .unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer"'' 8 by reason of faulty design. Deans Wade and Keeton have
independently arrived at nearly identical conclusions on how to determine
whether a "defect" in a strict liability sense is present in a given product.I 9
Both men agree that the term "defective" should be used only in the sense
of an "unintended condition, a miscarriage in the manufacturing pro-
cess."' 90 It might be said that an improperly designed product is "defec-
tive," but it is only defective when it is "unreasonably dangerous."'19
Hence, the determinative test is whether the product was "unreasonably
dangerous," or not reasonably safe.1
9 2
of an injury-producing defect that affects an entire line of products than the occasional mistake in the
manufacturing process. Furthermore, strict liability is often imposed on the original manufacturer
because he is the party best able to eliminate the risk. In the case of a design defect, the manufacturer
may well be the only party able to eliminate the risk. Finally, for both "design" and "manufacturing"
defects, strict tort liability reaches up the ladder of vertical privity to those parties best able to distribute
the costs of these risks among the public. See Comment, Products Liabilty: Is § 402A Strict Liability
Really Strict in Kentucky?, 61 Ky. L.J. 866 (1974).
186. Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457,465,525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974).
187. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal, Rptr. 433
(1972); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 111. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E,2d 465 (1966); McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488(1967); Schipperv. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70,207 A,2d
314 (1965); MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. Ct. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) & Comment g (1965).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(!) (1965).
189. See Keeton, Product Liability, supra note 5; Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: supra note
3; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5; Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5.
190. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability, supra note 3, at 562.




Wade and Keeton reject the Restatement (Second) of Torts formula-
tion that a product is unreasonably dangerous if "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it."'93 Such a test is too nebulous and presupposes a discernable
set of ordinary user expectations regarding safety features of complex
products about which the ordinary consumer knows little. 94 Further-
more, such an approach ties the availability of the cause of action in tort
to the expectations of the consumer. The basis of recovery seems to be
that the buyer did not get what he paid for, and is entitled to rescission
and restitution or the benefit of his bargain. Dean Wade contends that
this is an unacceptable way to conceptualize a tort cause of action.
95
Deans Wade and Keeton have proposed essentially the same test for
ascertaining whether the product is of the requisite degree of dangerous-
ness to be defective. The test begins by assuming that the manufacturer
knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did, and then asks whether
he was negligent in putting it on the market or supplying it to another.
9 6
Dean Keeton contends that a product is defective if it is unreasonably
dangerous as marketed:
[A] product ought to be regarded as "unreasonably dangerous" at the time of
sale if a reasonable man with knowledge of the product's condition, and an
appreciation of all the risks found to exist by the jury at the time of trial,
would not now market the product, or, if he did market it, would at least
market it pursuant to a different set of warnings and instructions as to its use.
Thus, a product is improperly designed if its sale would be negligence on the
part of a maker who had full knowledge of all the risks and dangers that were
subsequently found to exist in the product, regardless of the excuse that the
maker might have had for his ignorance of such dangers. Since the test is not
one of negligence, it is not based upon the risks and dangers that the maker
should have, in the exercise of ordinary care, known about. It is, rather,
danger in fact, as that danger is found to be at the time of the trial that
controls.
197
In accordance with strict products liability theory, the Wade-Keeton test
places a greater burden than negligence on the manufacturer, because the
law presumes he has knowledge of the product's dangerous propensity that
he might not reasonably be expected to have. 198 In essence, such a test
vests the hypothetical reasonable man with full knowledge of the product's
tendency to injure in the manner it has been alleged to have injured, and
asks "whether the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condi-
tion of the product was outweighed by the social utility attained by putting
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
194. See Keeton, Product Liability, supra note 5, at 37.
195. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability. supra note 5, at 833.
196. Keeton, Product Liability. supra note 5, at 37-38; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort
Liability supra note 5, at 834-35; Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5. at 15.
197. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability. supra note 3, at 568.
198. See Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457,465,525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974).
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it out in this fashion."' 99 This reflects the weighing process by which tort
law commonly executes sound social policy. 00
The Wade-Keeton test is advantageous in many respects. The test
reflects the tort nature of the strict products liability action by weighing the
risk of an action against its social utility. It discards standards of tort
liability that are tied to the expectations of the parties. Although it
differentiates between negligence theory and strict products liability
theory, the Wade-Keeton test employs traditional concepts of the reasona-
ble man, with which juries have been comfortable. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the test suggests one standard of defectiveness, applicable to
"manufacturing" and "design" defects alike. As has often been observed,
strict products liability diverges from negligence law principles most
markedly when the manufacturing process has gone awry.20° To put an
extreme example in terms of the Wade-Keeton test, the jury would be
asked to determine whether the reasonably prudent man would knowingly
market a can of soup that contained a dead rat. As to conscious design
choices by the ordinary manufacturer, little practical difference exists
between negligence and strict products liability concepts. 20 2 Negligence
principles charge the manufacturer with knowledge of the reasonably
foreseeable dangers associated with the chosen product design and ask if
his action in marketing the product was reasonable, while strict products
liability assumes actual knowledge on the part of the manufacturer of the
specific danger in issue, and then inquires into reasonableness. Liability
standards will thus be similar under both theories in the case of a design
choice made knowingly by a competent manufacturer who has assessed the
risks of the product he sells. Injury often results from a reasonably
foreseeable risk inherent in the product. In that situation negligence
199. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability. supra note 5, at 835.
200. Dean Wade suggests that the following factors are most relevant in applying this Wade-
Keeton standard of unreasonable product danger.
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be
as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5, at 837-38.
201. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5, at :336.
202. See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MicII.
L. REV. 1329, 1340-41 (1966); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design,
Instructions or Warning, 19Sw. L.J.43 (1965); Prosser, The Assault, supra note 3, at 1119; Rheingold,
Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325,326 n.5 (1971): Wade. On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5 at 841; Wade, Strict Tort Liability, supra note 5. at 15; Note,
Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 55 GEo. L.J. 286, 323 (1966).
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and strict products liability converge. Because the careful manufacturer
can usually, by proper testing, identify most risks attendant to use of his
product, the Wade-Keeton formulation has been given credit for providing
a more certain standard of liability for the manufacturer.0 3 In short,
Deans Wade and Keeton have fashioned a workable approach to "defect"
identification in strict products liability actions, one that pays heed to the
tort basis of strict products liability, and provides reasonable limitations
upon the liability of product suppliers, yet subjects those suppliers to a
greater duty than mere reasonable care in the preparation and marketing
of products. The Ohio courts should not hesitate to divorce strict
products liability from negligence law duties of due care, and take care to
fashion a distinct strict products liability action that embodies the impor-
tant societal concerns that have compelled its adoption.
V. CONCLUSION
With its opinion in Temple v. Wean United, Inc., the Supreme Court
of Ohio has added the strict products liability cause of action to the
panoply of weapons available to the injured product user, ridding Ohio
law of some of the troublesome features of "implied warranty in tort"
doctrine. It seems certain that recovery may now be had from the
manufacturer, middleman, or immediate vendor, regardless of the absence
or presence of privity, by a showing that a product placed in the stream of
commerce by those parties was defective, unreasonably dangerous,
reached the user or consumer without substantial change in condition,
and proximately caused injury in the course of its ordinary intended use.
In asserting liability against a product seller with whom the injured user
is not in privity, the plaintiff is no longer required to make the difficult
showing that the particular seller failed to exercise reasonable care in
the preparation and sale of the product. Nor is the consumer who has
sustained bodily injuries or property damage as a result of using a product
confined to recovery upon an express or implied warranty against the
seller, with the attendant problems of limited privity requirements and the
possibility of disclaimer of warranties and limitations upon recoverable
damages.
Temple represents a sound development in Ohio's tort law. In view
of the weighty public policy foundations that have propelled rapid
acceptance of strict products liability doctrine in a majority of American
jurisdictions, Ohio courts had been remiss in failing to unequivocally
embrace this tort cause of action. The inherent limitations of existing
modes of legal recovery necessitate the imposition of a stricter form of
203. See Holford, supra note 5, at 93. Indeed, in most strict tort liability situations and all
negligence suits, the most persistent source of uncertainty for the manufacturer with respect to liability
for design choices is that the manufacturer's notions of reasonableness will differ from those of the
jury.
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liability upon product sellers to insure that consumers are properly
protected from defective products that cause physical injury.
The Temple court recognized that strict products liability is meant to
be divorced from considerations of standards of care, because liability may
attach although the seller has exercised all possible care. Nevertheless, the
logic of the opinion suggests that alleged defects in the intended design of
the product, as opposed to individual manufacturing flaws in isolated
goods, may be subjected to a less demanding standard of scrutiny than
under strict products liability doctrine. One reading of the case suggests
that a showing of a failure to exercise reasonable care on the part of a
manufacturer-seller is necessary for liability to attach in strict tort for a
defect in the design of the product. This approach to products liability
cases would impose negligence-based liability standards in the designing of
products, while true strict products liability would be the norm in the
manufacturing process. Such a bifurcated view of strict products liability
doctrine would be highly undesirable; Ohio's courts should seek to shape
one standard of truly strict tort liability in appraising the alleged
defectiveness of a product, be the shortcoming one arising in the design or
the manufacturing process.
Timothy C. McCarthy
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